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Q: Will the storage site be safe? A: Safety and the environment will be the top priorities at the storage site. Strict federal rules and oversight will keep it that way. PFS will follow rules from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Commission oversees rules for the nuclear power industry. All workers at the site will be carefully selected and trained to perform their jobs just like at a nuclear power plant. Q: What will security be like at the storage site? A: Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules will not allow us to describe security in detail. There will be tall fences, and guards will watch over the storage site. The containers are designed to survive attacks from the outside whether on purpose or not. Security will meet all government rules. Top
However, PFS and many utility companies believe it makes much better sense to provide a temporary storage site that could be used by many utilities. This would save a great deal of money and would be easier to monitor and protect. For example, if twenty companies pay to build one site, it would cost much less than building twenty separate sites. Both options would be safe, but one shared site makes much more sense and provides a good financial opportunity for the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and the surrounding community. Q: The state alleges that proposed storage casks and canisters have not been tested and that some casks already in use have had problems in manufacturing and loading. Is this true? A: The storage system PFS will use, which includes canisters, transportation casks and storage casks, has been certified by the NRC as meeting all regulatory requirements for safety. To earn certification, the company that designed and supplies the casks is required to prove, through scale model testing and computer simulations, that the casks are designed to withstand transportation accidents, as well as other natural or man-made threats, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, fires, or attacks. Although NRC does not require full-scale testing, and our casks have not been tested in that way, earlier generations of the casks have been tested full-scale and have survived impacts, drops, burning, and submersion without release of radiation. Furthermore, the cask manufacturer, the utility companies, and PFS are required to have quality assurance programs designed to prevent or catch defects that may cause a problem. The NRC also carefully inspects manufacturing, loading and storage practices to ensure compliance with regulations. It is true that the quality assurance programs that are in place have detected rare defects in manufacturing and in loading. The problems were addressed and did not result in injury or the release of radioactive materials. Such incidents are investigated by the NRC and their reports are available to the public on their Web site (www.nrc.gov). Q: As a "temporary" facility, will this be as safe as a permanent facility? A: Yes. The spent fuel rods will be shipped to this facility in heavy metal casks and then placed inside 19-foot tall rugged steel and concrete casks and stored on three-foot thick reinforced concrete pads above ground. This is a storage method that has proven safe at other facilities in Idaho, Washington, Minnesota and other temporary locations around the country. Experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who monitor all of these sites are satisfied that this is a safe way to store these materials for the time frame we are considering. But the permanent facility contemplates storage for hundreds, thousands or more years and therefore requires extensive scientific study to determine the safest storage methods over geologic time. Q: How will the site be protected from potential terrorist threats? A: First of all, the site must have a security plan that is approved and tested by the NRC. Details of the plan cannot be released as it would compromise security. Secondly, experience has shown that spent fuel is an unattractive terrorist target. In the 40 years of commercial nuclear power generation, there has never been a diversion of spent nuclear fuel. Why? First, the enormous weight of the fuel cask would inhibit a hijack attempt. Second, terrorists would expose themselves to potentially lethal doses of radiation in the unlikely event they were able to open a cask. Third, the pellets of spent fuel would not be easily converted to a form that could threaten a city. The industry says that terrorists who wanted to use spent fuel to obtain weapons-grade material for a nuclear bomb would have to set up and operate a reprocessing plant - a feat that would probably be more difficult than stealing a bomb. Q: What safeguards will the PFS facility have to discourage sabotage? A: The facility has a security plan as required by federal regulations. The plan is a classified document, not available for general public inspection, which ensures the security of the facility. However, it has been made available to authorized state officials for review and the state had the opportunity to bring security issues or concerns before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. PFS will comply with, or exceed, all of NRC's stringent regulations pertaining to security or the license will not be granted. Q: How can PFS be sure that the facility can withstand any act of sabotage or terrorism? A: Experts agree that the robust design and construction of casks and security systems would deter acts of sabotage. Furthermore, the spent fuel itself is inert and, if attacked, would not cause enough damage to make it an attractive target. Experts agree, and experience has proven, that terrorist targets are more likely to be in highly populated, rather than remote, areas. Nevertheless, in the wake of terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001, regulators and owners charged with the safety of nuclear facilities are taking a closer look at their already stringent security measures. As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) noted in a series of questions and answers released to the media, "Nuclear power plants have inherent capability to protect public health and safety through such features as robust containment buildings, redundant safety systems, and highly trained operators. They are among the most hardened structures in the country and are designed to withstand extreme events, such as hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes. In addition, all NRC licensees with significant radiological material have emergency response plans to enable the mitigation of impacts on the public in the event of a release. However, the NRC did not specifically contemplate attacks by aircraft such as Boeing 757s or 767s and nuclear power plants were not designed to withstand such crashes. Detailed engineering analyses of a large airliner crash have not yet been performed." Facilities that store spent nuclear fuel, like the one proposed by Private Fuel Storage, pose less of a risk than a nuclear plant. First, the fuel is "spent"; that is, it has decayed and lost much of its energy, and it is stored in a way that prevents the chain reaction that occurs in a nuclear reactor. Secondly, it is a much smaller target than a skyscraper and would be more difficult to hit. Finally, if spent fuel casks were hit, the result would be far less catastrophic than an attack on a building where thousands of people are gathered. The spent fuel would not explode; there is nothing in it that would fuel a fire; and the area of contamination would most likely remain within the boundary of the facility. Thus, a spent fuel storage facility would be a far less appealing target to a terrorist bent on dramatic devastation. Q: Is it safe to build a facility like this so close to a military test and training range? Isn't it likely that a missile or plane could crash into the PFS facility? A: PFS has shown that the probability of a plane or missile crash into its facility is extremely low. The test and training range coexists safely with adjacent populated areas as well as other hazardous material industries. This is an issue that will be argued before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in 2001.
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A: Spent fuel can be safely stored temporarily
just about anywhere. Some utilities probably will choose to keep
their fuel in their own state. In fact, there are at least 12
outdoor storage sites safely in use now around the country. One
is less than 50 miles from Washington, D.C.