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Q: Don't the dangers of transporting high-level nuclear waste far outweigh the advantages of a centralized storage facility? A: No. Because of the robust nature of the shipping casks and the policies and procedures in place to safeguard shipments, there is insignificant risk involved in the transportation of spent fuel rods. In the past 30 years, there have been nearly 3,000 shipments of spent fuel by rail and/or highway. There has never been an accident that resulted in radiation-related injury, death, or environmental damage.
Utah officials have been quoted in news articles saying that transportation of nuclear waste through the state is safe. "We're used to transportation of spent fuel through the state," said Bill Sinclair, Utah Division of Radiation Control director, in a May 21, 1996, article in the Deseret News. "It's a well-regulated practice, and we've never had any accidents of any consequence." Q: Won't the increased volume of waste moving on the nation's highways and railroads increase the likelihood of disaster? A: No. Although the statistical likelihood of an accident occurring increases with the number of shipments, the radiological risk to the public remains virtually non-existent due to several factors: First, almost all of these statistically calculated accidents will be "fender benders" that do not even involve the cask. Second, in those rare cases where the accident may be more severe, the cask design prevents leakage of the contents. In other words, increased shipping and the possibility of an increase in the number of accidents do not translate into radiological "risk" to the public. Q: How do you respond to the charge that moving so much nuclear waste over such distances is like a "mobile Chernobyl?" A: The term "mobile Chernobyl" is no more than an irresponsible anti-nuclear scare tactic to raise frightening images of the consequences of radiological contamination such as that which occurred after the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident. But the image is totally misleading. There is no comparison between an accident at a Russian operating power plant that lacked modern U.S. safety features, and any credible accident involving spent fuel transportation casks. Spent fuel rods, which have been "cooled" in reactor pools for at least five years, are stored in a passive environment with no chance of a chain reaction that could cause air-borne release. The NRC not only regulates nuclear utilities and nuclear storage sites, but also the design and construction of canisters and casks used to store and transport nuclear materials. The federal regulation governing transportation casks ensures that the casks are designed to withstand any credible accident scenario. Casks are designed and demonstrated to meet the following hypothetical accident conditions:
No other packaging designed for hazardous materials meets such stringent standards.
Q: Did PFS consider the environmental impacts of transporting spent fuel rods? A: Yes. PFS considered the transportation impacts on the region of the PFS facility, as required under federal regulations and found the impacts to be insignificant. Furthermore, transportation impacts in general have been found to be insignificant by international experts, the NRC, DOE and the courts. Q: How can we be sure that these used nuclear fuel shipments will move safely through our state on the railroads? A: We currently have nuclear materials being transported on railroads and on the interstates. In nearly 3,000 shipments of spent fuel, only seven shipping containers have ever been involved in accidents. No accident resulted in the release of radioactive material. Not only are the storage and shipping casks carefully regulated by the NRC, but the transportation itself is regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The railroad industry is required to have special provisions for tracking and monitoring transportation of these types of materials, and for responding to any problems should they occur. Furthermore, PFS would be required to provide first emergency responders and to work with state and local governments on emergency response issues. Q: How will PFS get the spent fuel canisters from the Union Pacific rail line to the proposed storage site on the Skull Valley Goshute reservation? A: In its license application to the NRC, PFS stated that transportation from the main rail line to the site would either be via heavy haul truck down Skull Valley Road or by a rail line that would have to be built. The application, as well as subsequent public statements by PFS, also noted that additional transportation corridor studies would be undertaken. Q: What is the status of the transportation study? A: The license application submitted to the NRC for review and approval contained two modes of transportation: heavy haul and direct rail. Studies were begun shortly after the application was submitted to determine a preferred mode and route to the storage facility. These studies considered not only the Skull Valley Road route but all possible routes to the facility. The study concluded that the preferred route would be a new rail corridor on the west side of Skull Valley, starting at the Union Pacific main line at Low. The alternate route would be the existing Skull Valley Road corridor using heavy haul trucks from a new intermodal transfer location approximately two miles west of Rowley Junction. The new rail corridor required detailed environmental surveys to confirm its viability. These surveys determined
These surveys were begun in the spring of 1998 and completed in the summer of 1998. Following the decision by the PFS Board to focus on the rail line as the primary route to the site, a license application revision was submitted. The environmental impacts of the rail line are part of the overall environmental impact statement being produced by the NRC. Q: Who will oversee the Intermodal Transfer Point and assure its safety? A: The intermodal transfer operation is part of the transportation process, which is regulated by the NRC. Furthermore, the transportation cask is licensed by the NRC to withstand any conceivable impacts at the intermodal transfer point or elsewhere during the transportation process. There will be access-control, trained personnel, specialized equipment, and quality assurance requirements. A handling accident during transfer would certainly fall within the design basis of the cask. In other words, the cask is designed to withstand a severe transportation accident without leakage.
Q: What if there are bottlenecks at the intermodal transfer point or rail yards in major cities; won't this increase the likelihood of accidents or the risk of sabotage? A: No. First, the casks will be shipped on "dedicated" trains, meaning that the train will carry no other equipment or cargo other than the spent fuel destined to the PFS facility. Thus, there would be no cause for switch delays or layovers in rail yards. Second, the shipping of casks and transfer from rail to heavy haul vehicle will be carefully scheduled by PFS to avoid bottlenecks. Government regulations prohibit the casks from remaining at the transfer point for any extended period of time. During the transfer, the spent fuel will remain in NRC-approved shipping casks, which provide adequate shielding to protect workers, the public, and the environment from radiation exposure. Safeguards and security measures will apply while the casks are at the transfer point, as well as throughout the transportation process. Q: Why does PFS seem to feel that sabotage is not a credible possibility during the transportation process, including the intermodal transfer point? A: Experts agree that spent fuel rods are an unattractive target for terrorists for several reasons: First, a transportation cask will weigh 75 - 100 tons, and would require special equipment to handle it. It is not something that could be put in the back of a pickup truck and carried off. Second, the fuel inside cannot be used to make a bomb without a sophisticated reprocessing plant. Third, anyone attempting to penetrate the thick steel cask risks personal exposure and harm from radiation. Fourth, casks used to transport spent fuel have been tested and proven to withstand severe accidents or incidents, including bomb blasts. Finally, the potential damage that could be postulated from a breach in a cask, would be relatively minor compared with the damage that terrorists could cause for non-nuclear "targets" or by using other terrorist "tools," such as chemical or biological agents. Q: Is it true that PFS is not required to meet the same transportation standards as government shipments of radioactive materials? A: No. The same NRC and DOT regulations that apply to government shipments also apply to private shipments. Shipments of spent fuel under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act will comply with the same DOT and NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 71 that shipment of spent fuel to the PFS facility will comply with. PFS will follow all applicable laws governing the transportation of spent fuel. Furthermore, PFS member utilities have had experience with spent fuel shipments and have established a record of best practices that will be used by PFS. Although not specifically required by regulations, PFS plans to make shipments by dedicated train, not mixed with other freight cargo. Designated departments in each state will be notified of spent fuel shipments in advance. This is required by federal regulation. Q: Has anyone assessed the risks of transporting the quantities of spent fuel PFS will need to ship? A: The NRC, which is responsible for regulations governing packaging and other aspects of spent fuel transportation, has analyzed the risks of spent fuel storage for many years. The NRC performed a comprehensive evaluation of the spent fuel transportation risks over twenty years ago to support Federal regulation of such shipments. The NRC determined that the risks of spent fuel transportation are negligible. The NRC is currently completing a reassessment of its conclusions regarding transportation risks from its comprehensive evaluation. The reassessment has thus far confirmed that the risks are negligible and, in fact, actual transportation risks based on modern transportation cask designs and transportation conveyances are much lower than the earlier study predicted. A final report on the NRC's reassessment is expected to be issued in summer 2000.
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