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Aircraft Crash Hazards Study

Summary: Private Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS), with assistance from three senior retired Air Force officers, analyzed the risk of aircraft, bomb or missile accidents at the proposed Skull Valley temporary storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. The study concludes that the risk of such an accident is extremely low, less than one in a million per year, and well below the regulatory standards set by the NRC. It further concludes that even if such an accident were to occur, it is even more unlikely that any radioactive material would be released to the environment from the heavy concrete and steel casks in which it will be stored at the facility.

Background: The PFS study analyzed Air Force practices and procedures, Air Force accident data and the results of those accidents, and then calculated the probability of an accident at the PFS site. PFS further analyzed the nature and result of an impact in the unlikely event an aircraft, bomb or cruise missile were to hit at or near the facility. Assisting PFS with the study were three senior retired Air Force officers: a former Air Force Chief of Safety and C-141 wing commander, a former B-52 wing commander, and a former F-16 pilot and commander of the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base.

Facility Description
The PFS facility will store spent nuclear fuel sealed inside welded stainless steel canisters. The canisters will be placed within cylindrical steel, reinforced concrete casks approximately 2-feet thick. Each cask weighs approximately 170 tons when full. The spent fuel cask storage area at the facility will cover approximately 99 acres (0.15 sq. mi.). It will contain 4,000 spent fuel storage casks at full capacity.

PFS Site in Relation to the UTTR
The Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) is used by the U.S. Air Force for military training. The southern portion of the UTTR is located west of the Stansbury Mountains and the Great Salt Lake and is roughly 150 miles long and 100 miles wide. The PFS site is located more than 18 statute miles east of the eastern land boundary of the UTTR and more than eight statute miles northeast of the northeastern boundary of Dugway Proving Ground. The site does lie within the Sevier B military operating area (MOA), which is part of the airspace of the UTTR. But the portion of the Sevier B MOA in Skull Valley near the PFSF site is only used by F-16 aircraft from Hill Air Force Base to fly to the southern part of the UTTR. Some of that flight may involve low-altitude navigation training, but all of the activity in Skull Valley is routine and low-risk. The Sevier B MOA itself is a large region, approximately 145 miles long. Additional Air Force training and testing activity does take place on the southern portion of the Sevier B MOA, distant from the PFS site.

Military Flight Risks
Military aircraft flying roughly in the vicinity of Skull Valley consist of four groups:

  • F-16 aircraft flying from Hill AFB through Skull Valley on the way to the UTTR;
  • aircraft conducting training in the restricted airspace on the UTTR to the west of the PFS site;
  • aircraft leaving the UTTR on an instrument flight route to return to Hill AFB; and
  • aircraft flying to and from Michael Army Airfield on Dugway Proving Ground.

PFS has calculated that the chance that a military aircraft flying on or near the UTTR would crash and hit the PFS facility would be less than four in ten million per year. That is approximately equal to the chance per year that an individual living in the United States would be killed by being struck by lightning. It is nearly 10 times less than the chance that any individual in the United States would be killed in a plane crash.

Weapon Training Risk
Air Force use of bombs or missiles on the UTTR would pose no hazard to the PFS facility. Targets on the UTTR are located only on Defense Department land and the PFS site is located more than 20 miles from the nearest aircraft target. The Air Force strictly controls the use of weapons on the UTTR and no weapon has ever been accidentally released outside of designated launch or release areas on the UTTR. Aircraft flying over Skull Valley are not permitted to arm their weapons until after they reach the restricted areas on the range, where combat training takes place. Additionally, there are no target approach routes over Skull Valley.

Cruise Missile Risk
Cruise missile testing also would not pose a significant hazard to the PFS facility. Cruise missile tests are carefully planned to ensure their safety. Cruise missile targets on the UTTR are located more than 18 miles from the PFS site. Air Force instructions require that cruise missile flight paths avoid inhabited areas. In practice, the Air Force maintains a distance of at least 2.3 miles between missile paths and such areas. The presence of inhabited areas in English Village on Dugway Proving Ground, south of the PFS site, and on the Goshute Indian Reservation, where the PFS site is located, restrict the space available to the Air Force for cruise missile flight on that part of the UTTR even if the PFS facility is never built.

In addition, each cruise missile tested on the UTTR must have a Flight Termination System (FTS), which is designed to quickly end the flight of the missile if a problem occurs. The FTS can bring the missile to the ground well within the 2.3-mile separation distance between missile flight paths and inhabited areas on the UTTR. Range Safety Officers can activate the FTS at any time if necessary. The UTTR has never experienced an FTS failure. (The December 1997 accident on the UTTR, in which a cruise missile struck a cosmic ray observatory trailer, occurred not because of an FTS failure, but because test planners were unaware that the observatory was located at the missile target site, which was on Defense Department land. The PFS site is 18 miles away from the nearest cruise missile target and more than eight miles from the nearest Defense Department land.) So the chance that a cruise missile would hit the PFS facility is extraordinarily low. Therefore, the presence of the PFS facility would not require the Air Force to restrict its testing of cruise missiles on the UTTR.

Radioactive Material Release Risk
Additional safety at the PFS facility would be provided by the strength of the concrete and steel casks that would contain the spent nuclear fuel. If an aircraft or a missile were to hit the facility, which would be extremely unlikely, the storage casks would likely prevent any radioactive material from being released to the environment.

Analysis of Air Force crash data shows that the most probable cause of an F-16 accident near Skull Valley would be an engine failure. In the event of an engine failure, pilots are trained to climb away from the ground, slow the aircraft, and attempt to restart the engine. As a result, the typical impact speed for the F-16 is between 230 and 260 miles per hour (200-225 knots). This is well below the impact speed that PFS has calculated that would cause an F-16 engine to penetrate a storage cask and expose the spent fuel. The only part of the aircraft that could penetrate the cask is the engine. The other parts are deformable and would break off or disintegrate upon hitting a solid object like a cask. Because they are much lighter than aircraft like the F-16, the impact of a cruise missile also most likely would not penetrate a storage cask and would not release any radioactive material to the environment. If the aircraft or missile was descending at impact, or struck the cask at an angle or off center, then the speed needed to penetrate the cask would be even higher, as the aircraft engine or missile would tend to deflect off the side of the cask. Because the storage cask is cylindrical, most impacts would be at least somewhat off center. Therefore, the actual chance that an accident at the PFS facility would cause a release of radioactive material is much lower than the very low chance that an aircraft or missile would hit the site in the first place.

Finally, in the highly unlikely event that an impact occurred at a speed and angle sufficient to penetrate a spent fuel storage cask, the consequences would be localized and minimal. Brookhaven National Laboratory has assessed the consequences of an accident in which a cask is penetrated by an object blown into it at a speed of 567 miles per hour by an extremely severe tornado. The maximum amount of radiation received by an individual off site as a result of the accident would be significantly less than the NRC regulatory limit for public exposure from accidents. The study also shows that the accident would require the cleanup of 1.3 acres of land at a cost of about $6 million.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the chance that a military aircraft, bomb or missile would hit the PFS facility is extremely low. In addition, because of the concrete and steel casks, the chance that an accident would cause a release of radioactive material would be even lower. In the unlikely event that an impact did cause a release, the effects would be localized and minimal. Therefore, the presence of the PFS facility would not require the Air Force to curtail its operations on or around the UTTR. Accordingly, the PFS facility also would not threaten the continued operation of Hill AFB and accordingly would not threaten the economy of the State of Utah.

Safety Evaluation Report
Environmental Impact Statement
Seismic Study


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