News Release 3/31/03
Contact: Sue Martin
801-532-5322 or
801-209-3062
Private Fuel Storage Challenges
Licensing Board Decision
SALT LAKE CITY (March 31, 2003)
- With the filing of three documents today, Private Fuel Storage
(PFS) has responded to the partial initial decision issued by
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) on March 10, 2003,
ruling that it could not recommend a license until PFS has addressed
its concerns about potential military aircraft crashes at the
proposed Skull Valley, UT site.
"Our three-pronged approach
is based on our need to address licensing concerns as quickly
as possible so that we may proceed with construction and operation
of our facility," said John Parkyn, PFS Chairman. "The
nation's need for safe, cost-effective, temporary storage of
spent fuel will increase every year until a federal repository
is available."
Today's filings include
- A petition to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) requesting a review of the ASLB ruling;
- A report to the ASLB outlining PFS's
intent to exercise an option presented by the Board to demonstrate
that the consequences of a hypothetical F-16 crash at the facility
would fall within the NRC's safety regulations; and
- A motion to the ASLB asking
for a favorable licensing decision conditioned on a limit to
the size of the facility so that even using the ASLB's probability
assumptions, an F-16 crash would still be a "non-credible"
event.
In its petition for review to
the NRC Commissioners, PFS points out that the ASLB ruling ignored
evidence presented by both PFS and the NRC staff showing that
pilots are trained and able to avoid sites on the ground before
having to eject from an airplane. PFS's expert witnesses had
estimated that pilots in control of their planes could avoid
sites on the ground 95 percent of the time; when this figure
was used in the probability formula, the result was a crash probability
of less than one in a million, thus falling within the NRC's
definition of a "non-credible event." The ASLB ruling,
on the other hand, gave pilots no credit at all for the ability
to avoid sites on the ground, thus ignoring testimony presented
by Air Force pilots and retired Air Force officials, including
a witness called by the State in its opposition to the PFS license.
PFS also argues that the ASLB
did not consider substantial conservatisms in PFS's analysis
of crash probability, but instead rigidly applied the "one
in a million" criterion. PFS points out that NRC guidance
and case law demonstrate that the NRC accepts and expects consideration
of conservative margins when applying probability criteria to
either nuclear plants or storage facilities. For example, PFS's
analysis conservatively assumed a fully loaded facility with
4,000 casks, when, in fact, the facility will fill over time.
PFS also conservatively analyzed for spent fuel casks in the
canister transfer building at all times, when, in fact, the transfer
building will contain spent fuel casks only when transfer operations
actually occur. In addition, PFS assumed that if a plane struck
the canister transfer building it would strike a cask, when,
in fact, the building is large enough that an impact to the building
might not affect a cask inside. PFS also assumed military flights
might occur anywhere across Skull Valley and over the facility,
when, in fact, evidence showed that planes fly predominantly
east of Skull Valley Road, several miles from the proposed facility.
Finally, PFS argues that Commission
review is appropriate because the ASLB improperly excluded PFS
testimony on the record showing that even if an F-16 were hypothetically
to crash into the facility, the aircraft would not penetrate
a cask and cause a radioactive release.
In its report to the ASLB, PFS
said that it will exercise the option presented by the Board
to present additional testimony and technical analysis related
to the consequences of a hypothetical F-16 crash at the site.
PFS recommended an April 30 deadline for all the parties to submit
to the Board an estimate of when their additional technical information
would be completed so that hearings can be scheduled. PFS believes
that the analysis will demonstrate that an F-16 crash at the
site would not penetrate the storage casks and would therefore
not result in any releases of radioactive materials from the
casks.
In its third filing, PFS' motion
to the ASLB argues that the Board's concerns about aircraft crash
probability would be satisfied by a license condition limiting
the numbers of casks that could be stored at the site. One of
the factors in the mathematical probability formula is site size;
the smaller the site, the less the probability of an aircraft
crash. Thus, with a limit of 336 casks (rather than the 4,000
cask maximum in the PFS application), the probability of an aircraft
crash would fall within the "one in a million" probability
criterion.
"If we received a conditional
license to operate a smaller site, we would be able to proceed
with planning and construction while continuing to address ASLB
concerns and make our case for a larger facility," said
John Parkyn, PFS Chairman. "Our goal is still a license
for a 4,000-cask facility."
Private Fuel Storage is a consortium
of nuclear utility companies that pooled resources to license,
construct and operate a centralized temporary facility to store
spent nuclear fuel for up to 20-40 years, until the proposed
permanent federal repository at Yucca Mountain, NV is ready to
accept the spent fuel stored at the facility. PFS signed a lease
with the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians in 1997 to use
820 acres of its reservation for the 100-acre facility. In June
1997, PFS submitted its application to the NRC.
The spent fuel is now stored
in pools or dry storage containers at each power plant, many
of which will run out of on-site storage capacity before Yucca
Mountain is completed. To keep their plants operating at levels
that meet growing electricity needs, the utilities must have
other interim storage options. In addition, many utilities are
currently spending millions each year to maintain storage pools
at plants that are no longer operating but cannot fully decommission
until they can move their spent fuel off site.
For further information about
the PFS facility and its history, visit www.privatefuelstorage.com.
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